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The evidence suggests strong parallels between the banking
panics of the pre-Depression era and the 2008 crisis
The banking crisis of 2008 has since drawn comparisons with the banking crisis of the late 1920s
which in turn led to the Great Depression. Andrew Jalil writes that before the 1930s, banking panics
were a common part of US economic history. Using data from seven major banking panics between
1833 and 1907, he argues that when downturns are associated with major banking panics,
recessions tend to be deeper, longer, and slower to recover from.
As the banking crisis of 2008 erupted, policymakers and economists alike asked:  How different is
this crisis from previous ones?  The United States—perhaps the epicenter of the 2008 crisis—had
not been afflicted with a major banking crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, rendering the post-crisis
outlook particularly uncertain.
Yet, prior to the 1930s, banking panics were common in US history.  As such, the pre-Depression era may serve as a
valuable laboratory to better understand the effects of banking disturbances on the US economy.  Moreover, while
comparisons between the financial panics of the Great Depression and the 2008 crisis were widespread at the time
the crisis erupted, comparisons with these earlier panics were much more muted.
In new research, I investigate the macroeconomic effects of the major banking panics of the pre-Great Depression
era.  In the process, I shed new light on a series of questions:  By how much does national output fall in the aftermath
of major banking panics?  Are recessions with major banking panics more severe than recessions without them?  Are
recoveries following major banking panics fast and robust or are they more likely to be protracted and slow?  More
generally, what are the effects of banking panics on the macroeconomy? I find that such downturns with major
banking panics are linked to large and longer declines in output, which in turn lead to slower growth during the
subsequent recovery.
To begin, because prior panic series—lists of panics—present contradictory accounts of when and where banking
panics occurred, I needed to carefully recreate a detailed history of banking panics in the United States.  To do this, I
systematically searched through more than 100 years of historical financial newspapers by reading newspaper
articles that reported bank failures, suspensions and runs.  Then, using a set of criteria that grouped clusters of bank
runs, suspensions and failures as distinct banking panics, I reconstructed a detailed account of when and where
banking panics occurred from 1825 to 1929—that is, in the century before the Great Depression.
My new panic series identifies seven major banking panics that were nationwide in scope—1833, 1837, 1839, 1857,
1873, 1893, and 1907—along with many other regional, more localized banking panics.  The new series reveals
several interesting historical trends:  Major banking panics coincided with large declines in stock prices, occurred at a
rate of roughly one every 14 to 20 years (except for an elevated rate in the 1830s), and were more likely to occur
during the Fall and Spring, those seasons characterized by stringent monetary conditions due to heightened demand
for money and credit from the agricultural sector.
Most notably, the new series allows me to conduct statistical tests to determine how macroeconomic variables, such
as output and the price level, behave in the aftermath of major banking panics.  The evidence indicates that major
banking panics have a causal and strongly negative effect on both output and prices.  According to my baseline
results, which are based on yearly industrial production data—the most reliable national output series that spans the
pre-WWI US economy, the estimated effect of a major banking panic on output is a decline of 10 percent in the year
following the panic, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 – The Impact of a Banking Panic on Output
Note: Estimated impact shown in blue , along with the upper (red) and lower (green) standard
error bands
Furthermore, monthly construction data show that output falls rapidly, plummeting in the immediate months after the
outbreak of the crisis (Figure 2).
Figure 2- The Impact of a Banking Panic on Construction
Note: Estimated impact shown in blue , along with the upper (red) and lower (green) standard
error bands
Prices also fall quickly as Figure 3 shows, declining by roughly 7 percent over the course of a year.
Figure 3 – The Impact of a Banking Panic on the Price Level
Note: Estimated impact shown in blue , along with the upper (red) and lower (green) standard
error bands
In addition, equipped with a reliable listing of when banking panics occurred, I am able to examine how downturns
with major banking panics differed from downturns without them.  Table 1 presents the six recessions that occurred
between the Civil War and World War I.  For each recession, the chart reports four key macroeconomic indicators: 
the percentage decline in output from peak to trough, the length of the recession in years (the length of time from
peak to trough), the length of the recovery in years (the length of time output took to return to its prerecession peak),
and the average annual growth rate of output during the years of recovery.
Table 1- Recessions with and without Major Banking Panics
Note:  Output is measured using the Davix Index of Industrial Production.  Source:  Davis (2004, 2006)
The chart reveals a number of key findings.  First, downturns with major banking panics are associated with
dramatically larger declines in output (12.3 versus 4.7 percent).  Second, downturns with major banking panics were
longer than downturns without them, on average (1.7 years versus 1 year).  Third, recoveries were longer for
downturns with major banking panics (2.7 years versus 1 year).  Fourth, output growth was slower during recoveries
for downturns with major banking panics (6.7 versus 10.8 percent).
Together, these results indicate that banking panics were a major source of economic instability in the century before
the Great Depression.  Banking panics caused dramatic declines in output and were followed by comparatively slow
recoveries.  Also, recessions with major banking panics were more severe, on average, than recessions without
them.  Thus, the behavior of the US macroeconomy during the recent banking crisis—a peak-to-trough decline in
output that exceeded all other postwar US recessions, followed by a sluggish recovery—appears to parallel the
experience of the US macroeconomy during the major banking panics of the 19th and early 20th centuries.
This article is based on the paper, “A New History of Banking Panics in the United States, 1825-1929: Construction
and Implications” in the American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics.  
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